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session, the lessee's right would be vindicated without a personal
judgment, and his right could, in this respect, be classified as
real under the Code.
In conclusion, it seems that there has never been any defi-
nitive judicial statement as to the true nature of a real right in
Louisiana. The latest position taken by the court is that a real
right is the same as an interest as owner. An examination of
the code provisions indicates, however, that the true character-
istics of the real right are: (1) that it passes with the land,34
and (2) that it does not make anyone personally liable, but is
merely a charge on the property. 5
If the court should choose to interpret real rights in strict
adherence to the terms of the Code, it seems that the position
taken in the Reagan case must be amended to include those real
rights that are not synonymous with an interest as owner. If,
however, the present position is adhered to, and a real right is
confined to those rights which constitute an interest as owner,
it would seem that another name must be found for those real
rights that are not compatible with that definition. In any event,
it seems that the position of the court as to the nature of a real
right should be clarified.
Edward C. Abell, Jr.
Building Restrictions in Louisiana
The purpose of this Comment is to examine and analyze the
Louisiana law pertaining to building restrictions.1 In this
analysis a comparison with other means of restricting the use of
property will be made.
The building restriction is a limitation on the use of prop-
erty imposed by an ancestor in title in accordance with a general
plan where the purpose is to maintain certain building standards
and uniformity in improvements. 2 The law of building restric-
tions has primarily developed from judicial decisions beginning
34. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2011 (1870).
35. Id. art. 2012.
1. See Comment, 8 TuL. L. REV. 262 (1933).
2. See Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938) ; Rabouin v. Dutrey, 181 La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935) ; Hill v. Win. P.
Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928) ; Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157
(La. App. 1951).
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with the case of Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeau.8 Although
this case was not decided on the basis of the rights of holders
of title derived from a common ancestor,4 dicta in the case con-
cerning the rights of these holders or grantees 5 was adopted in
the later case of Hill v. William P. Ross, Inc.6 While the court
in the Hill case relied heavily on common law authority, the
court in the subsequent case of Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co.
v. Collie7 likened building restrictions to servitudes and quoted
extensively from the Civil Code." Thus the judicial development
of the Louisiana law of building restrictions has been from both
the common and civil law.
A building restriction may be easily distinguished from a
servitude since a building restriction requires "an ancestor in
title"9 and a "general plan"'10 while neither of these is required
for the establishment of a servitude." Further, there need be
only two estates involved to establish a predial servitude 2 while
the concept of the building restriction has developed .in the con-
text of multiple estates such as encountered in a subdivision. 3
While the building restriction and the servitude are the more
accepted means of restricting the use of property, a theory ad-
vanced in the recent case of Tucker v. Woodside'4 may also be
3. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
4. The action brought in the Queensborough case was for a resolution of the
sale between the vendor and vendee. The vendee had sold property to a Negro in
violation of a covenant contained in the contract. The court stated that probably
the occupants of other lots could not rescind the contract since that right was
not expressly reserved to them.
5. The court stated: "[I]t would seem as if they [the other landowners] might
not have the right to rescind the sale. . . . Their remedy would seem to have to
be restricted to injunction (mandatory and other) and damages, as stipulated in
the contract." Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 737, 67 So. 641,
646 (1915).
6. 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
7. 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841 (1938).
8. Id. at 527-28, 179 So. at 843.
9. Holloway v. Ransome, 216 La. 317, 43 So.2d 673 (1949) ; Alfortish v.
Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942) ; Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La.
App. 1951).
10. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941) ; Cambias v.
Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929) ; Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554
(La. App. 1958) ; Murphy v. Marino, 60 So.2d 128 (La. App. 1952).
11. While not a requisite to the validity of a servitude, an ancestor in title
may impose a servitude. See LA. CivIL CODE art. 729 et seq. (1870). The owner
has the right to establish any servitude on his estate that he deems proper. Id.
art. 709.
12. See id. art. 648. It is not contrary to the nature of servitudes that the
same servitude should be established on several estates for the benefit of one, or
that the same estate should be subject to a servitude for the benefit of several
estates. Id. art. 745.
13. See, e.g., Cambias v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929).
14. 53 So.2d 503 (La. App. 1951).
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valid. In this case the First Circuit Court of Appeal found that
a covenant restricting the use of property where the obligation
was due to a person was a real obligation running with the
land.'5 A restriction on the use of property where the obliga-
tion is due a person is not a predial servitude since the Code
requires the obligation be due to an estate. 16 Neither does the
restriction recognized in the Tucker case fall within the three
personal servitudes-use, usufruct, and habitation-recognized
by the Civil Code. 17 Since a restriction of this type is neither a
predial servitude nor a personal servitude enumerated in the
Civil Code, there is some reason to believe this expression of
the law may not be correct.'8
Establishment of the Building Restriction
While no clear pattern can be ascertained, it appears that
in imposing building restrictions, the early practice was to insert
the restriction in each individual sale. Today, the common prac-
tice appears to be that the vendor enters a declaration of the
building restrictions or a map of the property which contains
the restrictions into the conveyance records and subsequently
brings these restrictions to the purchasers' attention by refer-
ence in the act of sale. Owners of adjacent properties have
entered into agreements styled building restrictions, yet these
restrictions lack the necessary characteristic of an ancestor in
title. Although these agreements do not appear to be building
restrictions, a court could give effect to the owners' intentions
by finding that the owners established predial servitudes on
their property.'
If a doubt arises as to the intention of the ancestor in title
15. Although Article 2012 lists only three kinds of real obligations, the court
felt that this listing was not intended to be exclusive when considered in the con-
text of Article 2013 and Article 2015. But in the case of Cambias v. Douglas, 167
La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929), where the vendee had bound herself to erect on
the premises a single residence, the Supreme Court found this similar covenant to
be a personal obligation. See Begnaud v. Hill, 109 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1959) ;
Herzberg v. Harrison, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1958); Murphy v. Marino, 60
So.2d 128 (La. App. 1952) ; LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App. 1949).
But cf. Lowe v. Wilson, 194 Tenn. 267 (Tenn. App. 1952).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 646 (1870).
17. Ibid.
18. See note 15 supra.
19. This type of covenant could easily be a predial servitude. It is established
by an agreement between landowners for the benefit of the estates which is exactly
the manner prescribed by the Civil Code. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 646, 709 (1870).
The Code also permits the establishment of a servitude for the benefit of several
estates upon one estate and the establishment of servitudes on several estates for
the benefit of one estate. Id. art. 745.
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to establish a general plan of restriction, it appears to have
been the policy of the courts to resolve the doubt in favor of
the free use of the property. Thus where the restrictions are
established by the ancestor in title by insertion in each in-
dividual sale, omission from a substantial portion of the deeds
has been held to prevent the establishment of the restriction. 20
Even in the instance where the restrictions are properly inserted
in each sale, the failure to make these restrictions uniform has
been sufficient to cast a doubt on the intention of the ancestor
in title to establish a general plan of restriction.
21
For a valid building restriction, the covenant must be for
the exclusive benefit of other property owners, rather than for
the vendor imposing the restriction.2 2 Thus, where the, owner
has to obtain permission from the vendor to use the property
for a certain purpose, there is not a true building restriction, but
merely a personal covenant enforcable only between the parties.
23
Imposition of building restrictions on property after a
mortgage has been recorded will not affect the rights of the
mortgagee.24 The reason for this rule is that the placing of
building restrictions on the property might diminish its value
and thereby prejudice the mortgagee if he were bound by the
restrictions. The public records doctrine protects the mortgagee
in this situation.25
Action for Enforcement
Since building restrictions are established for the benefit of
the surrounding property, the right to enforce the restrictions
is a real right running with the land. 26 Thus the original ven-
dees and those who hold title under them have the right to en-
20. Cambias v. Douglas, 167 La. 791, 120 So. 369 (1929) ; Herzberg v. IHarri-
son, 102 So.2d 554 (La. App. 1958) ; Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App.
1951).
21. Murphy v. Marino, 60 So.2d 128 (La. App. 1952).
22. Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La. 521, 179 So. 841
(1938) ; Rabouin v. Dutrey, 181 La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935) ; Hill v. Win. P.
Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928).
23. LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263 (La. App. 1949).
24. Vernon v. Allphin, 98 So.2d 280 (La. App. 1957). LA. CIVIL CODE art.
750 (1870) provides substantially the same rights for mortgagees where the prop-
erty is subjected to a servitude after the property is mortgaged.
25. Ibid.
26. E.g., Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941) ; Hill v. Win.
P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928) ; Queensborough Land Co. v.
Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915). See Comment, 21 LOUISIANA LAW
Rgview 462 (1960).
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force these covenants. 27 When a violation of the restrictions on
the property occurs, it has been indicated that those owners
whose property was not affected by the violation could not bring
an action to enforce the covenant.28 However, it would seem that
property within a subdivision and subject to a restriction would
be near enough to be affected in some way by a violation even
though it was some distance from the place of the violation. 29
On the other hand, an attempt to enforce a restriction on prop-
erty outside of the original restricted area was ineffectual since
only property within the original restricted area could be within
the general plan intended by the ancestor in title.30
Remedies Available for Violation of Restrictions
Injunction is the usual remedy sought and granted in actions
concerning violations of building restrictions.31 In several in-
stances owners have been forced to remove buildings that were
erected in violation of a restriction 2 or were forced to cease cer-
tain activities that were violative of a building restriction."3
That damages would be an appropriate remedy is indicated by
references in a section of the Revised Statutes34 and the dicta in
the Queensborough case,35 even though there does not appear to
be any litigation raising this issue that has reached the appellate
level. Where a building restriction might be prescribed, substan-
tially violated, vague, or even where no restriction was estab-
lished, the sic utere servitude or the tort remedy of nuisance
might be available for the protection of owners of adjacent prop-
27. Ibid.
28. See Guyton v. Yancey, 125 So.2d 365 (La. 1961).
29. The effects of the lowering of value of property on the farther side of a
subdivision are felt throughout the subdivision when a building restriction is vio-
lated. The effect of having a violation creep house to house until it is next door
would also be a good reason to allow the enjoining of a violation in its inception.
See Finn v. Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La. App. 1954). But see Guyton v. Yancey,
125 So.2d 365 (La. 1961).
30. Begnaud v. Hill, 109 So.2d 562 (La. App. 1959).
31. E.g., Hill v. Wm. P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928) ; Guyton
v. Yancey, 115 So.2d 622 (La. App. 1959) ; Finn v. Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La.
App. 1954) ; Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1951).
32. E.g., Harris v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 330 (La. App. 1954) ; Plauche v. Albert,
42 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1949).
33. E.g., Rhodes v. Foti, 54 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1951) ; Sherrouse Realty Co.
v. Marine, 46 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1950) ; LeBlanc v. Palmisano, 43 So.2d 263
(La. App. 1949).
34. LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950) provides in part: "Actions to enjoin or to obtain
damages for . . . violation of restrictions .... " (Emphasis added.)
35. See note 5 supra.
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erty.3 6 It must be noted that where a violation of a building re-
striction is not a nuisance, this fact will not be a defense to the
action for violation of the restrictive covenant. 37
Termination of the Building Restriction
The covenant establishing the building restriction may pro-
vide for its termination after a specified period of time or upon
the happening of a certain event. A building restriction is also
deemed to be at an end in an area where there has been a gen-
eral abandonment of the plan of the ancestor in title. 5 To war-
rant an inference of a general abandonment of the scheme there
must be a sufficient number of violations of the particular re-
striction in relation to the number of lots affected by it.80 Thus
if the restriction requires that a residence be built facing a cer-
tain street, only the violations on property subject to this restric-
tion will be considered in determining if there has been a gen-
eral abandonment of the plan. 40 However, a number of minor
breaches would not warrant the inference of an abandonment of
the general plan since no iptent to abandon the scheme would be
shown. 41 Even where the violations of one restriction are suffi-
cient in number to constitute an abandonment of the plan, only
the building restriction which has been violated is considered as
having been abandoned. 42 Thus a change in a neighborhood from
residential to commercial would not affect a restriction relating
to the setback from the front of the property.43
Changes outside the restricted area, which would be indica-
tive of an abandonment of the plan if within the ambit of the
restriction, are usually not considered. 44 Even a general aban-
donment in one part of a subdivision will not disturb the validity
of the restriction in another portion of the subdivision where it
is still observed.4 5
36. Roche v. St. Romain, 51 So.2d 666 (La. App. 1951).
37. Harris v. Pierce, 73 So.2d 330 (La. App. 1954).
38. Hill v. Win. P. Ross, Inc., 166 La. 581, 117 So. 725 (1928); Finn v.
Murphy, 72 S6.2d 358 (La. App. 1954). Accord, Guyton v. Yancey, 115 So.2d
622 (La. App. 1959).
39. E.g., Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941); Finn v.
Murphy, 72 So.2d 358 (La. App. 1954) ; Rhodes v. Foti, 54 So.2d 534 (La. App.
1951).
40. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941).
41. Guyton v. Yancey, 115 So.2d 622 (La. App. 1959).
42. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941) ; Finn v. Murphy,
72 So.2d 358 (La. App. 1954) ; Rhodes v. Foti, 54 So.2d 534 (La. App. 1951).
43. Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942).
44. Plauche v. Albert, 42 So.2d 876 (La. App. 1949).
45. Salerno v. De Lucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947).
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The legislature has provided a two-year prescriptive period
on actions to enjoin or to obtain damages for the commission or
continuance of a violation of restrictions contained in the title
to land.46 This statute evidently includes not only building re-
strictions but servitudes and all other means of restricting the
use of land since it provides that "a violation of restrictions con-
tained in the title to land are prescribed. '47
Prescription under the statute terminates a building restric-
tion and frees the particular parcel of land from the restriction. 48
Prescription of a particular restriction on one parcel of prop-
erty will not affect other building restrictions validly imposed
on that property since no abandonment of the other restrictions
can be imputed to the adjacent owners.49 However, once a cer-
tain piece of property is free of a restriction, the restriction is
treated as if it never existed on that particular piece of prop-
erty.50 This was demonstrated in Chexnayder v. Rogers5' where
the property was freed of a commercial restriction. The owner
of the property was not only permitted to enlarge the business
premises but was allowed to conduct business of a different
nature. Although one lot is freed of a particular restriction by
prescription, this does not affect the same restriction on other
lots similarly situated, even those adjacent and owned by the
same person unless there has been a general abandonment of
the plan. 2
Some question exists as to the commencement of the two-
year prescriptive period even though the statute provides that
it is to begin at the "commencement" of the violation.5 ' The
court has indicated that prescription may not run where the vio-
lation is unnoticeable.5 4 In other instances an activity may not
be a violation when carried on as a modest operation but could
be a violation if the activity were expanded.55
In addition to the two-year prescription, the legislature has
46. LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 448.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Edwards v. Wiseman, 198 La. 382, 3 So.2d 661 (1941).
50. Ibid. But of. Salerno v. De Lucca, 211 La. 659, 30 So.2d 678 (1947).
Contra, The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1946-1947 Term
Property, 8 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 238 (1947).
51. 95 So.2d 381 (La. App. 1957).
52. Sherrouse Realty Co. v. Marine, 46 So.2d 156 (La. App. 1950).
53. LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 448.
54. See Roche v. St. Romain, 51 So.2d 666 (La. App. 1951).
55. Ibid. Here the question would be when the activity would become a viola-
tion, not if the activity was a violation.
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provided that the owners of a majority of the square footage of
land in a subdivision, where there is no provision for terminat-
ing the restrictions, may terminate them by recording an agree-
ment in the conveyance and mortgage records 6 of the parish in
which the land is located, provided that the restrictions must be
in effect fifteen years before their termination. 57 Although there
is no express provision for the termination of building restric-
tions for a portion of the restricted area, the language of the
statute would appear broad enough to permit this construction.
A proffered title which contains a building restriction that
has been violated but not prescribed should enable the vendee to
refuse specific performance where he was unaware of the viola-
tion at the time of the execution of the contract to purchase.68
Where it is clear that the restriction has lapsed through pre-
scription, it would seem that specific performance should be
granted since the statute provides that prescription terminates
the building restriction. In the event that it is uncertain whether
prescription has run, the granting of specific performance would
seem unjust to the vendee since the court's decision would not
be binding on third parties.5 It would seem that the best solu-
tion here would be for the vendor to seek additional time to per-
fect his title by obtaining a declaratory judgment.'0
Effect of Zoning Restricted Property
A valid restriction on the use of real property should not be
nullified nor superseded by the adoption of a zoning ordinance. 6
Thus the zoning of land in a residentially restricted area to com-
mercial usage would not have the effect of destroying the re-
strictive covenants or preventing their enforcement. The zoning
of an area as commercial, however, may be evidence of an aban-
donment of the general plan in that area.6 2 If one buys land free
of restrictive covenants, a subsequent zoning ordinance restrict-
56. No reason can be ascertained as to why the legislature thought it neces-
sary to require the recording of the agreement in the mortgage records.
57. LA. R.S. 9:5622 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1960, No. 448, § 1.
58. See Oubre v. Stassi, 56 So.2d 598 (La. App. 1952). Cf. Rabouin v. Dutrey,
181 La. 725, 160 So. 393 (1935).
59. A decision by the court that prescription had run would not prevent third
parties from bringing suit later to enjoin the violation. See Oubre v. Stassi, 56
So.2d 598 (La. App. 1952).
60. The vendor could join all the other landowners in an action to declare the
restriction to be prescribed. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDuRE arts. 1871-1873
(1960).
61. See Alfortish v. Wagner, 200 La. 198, 7 So.2d 708 (1942).
62. Munson v. Berdon, 51 So.2d 157 (La. App. 1951).
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ing the use of property would be valid since the holding of prop-
erty is subject at all times to a valid exercise of the police
power.0 8
Conclusion
The development of the Louisiana law of building restric-
tions will probably continue to be through further legislative
enactments and adaptation of common law theories and civilian
theories of servitude. Since there seems to be no predominance
of adaptation of the common law or civilian theories, it would
seem that the courts in developing the jurisprudence will con-
tinue to adapt the rules that appear to give the more just
results.
Martin Smith, Jr.
Union Enforcement of Individual Employee Rights
Arising from a Collective Bargaining Contract
It appears to be settled that vis a vis the employer, a col-
lective bargaining contract creates rights for individual em-
ployees, as well as for unions.' The distinction between employee
and union rights may be illustrated by comparing a contract pro-
vision which concerns individual wages of the employees 2 with a
provision which provides for arbitration of grievances.8 This
Comment is concerned with the enforcement by a union of the
individual rights of the employees as against the employer.
Section 301 (a) of the Labor-Management Relations Act
provides that either the union or the employer may sue in the
federal courts for the enforcement of a collective bargaining
contract.4 It has been held, however, that the individual em-
63. Ransome v. Police Jury of Parish of Jefferson, 216 La. 994, 45 So.2d 601
(1950).
1. Howlett, Contract Rights of the Individual Employee as Against the Em-
ployer, 8 LAD. L.J. 316, 319 (1957); Report of Committee on Improvement ofAdministration of Union Management Agreements, 1954, 50 Nw. L. REv. 143,
158 (1955).
2. See Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348
U.S. 437 (1955).
3. See Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353
U.S. 448 (1957).
4. 61 STAT. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952) : "Suits for violation of
contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing employees
in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this chapter, or between any such
labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
476 [Vol. XXI
